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This is the monster and the sleeping queen
And both have roots struck deep in your own mind,
This is reality that you have seen,
This is reality that made you blind.'
My first reaction to Professor Walker's essay was one of amused horror.
"Every year, thousands of law students graduate... thinking that they have been
trained for criminal practice, when they have not.",2 I read that and thought: "Some
whippersnapper is going to expose us at last! And now we will be forced by the
Administration to teach our students the skills they really need to practice criminal
law, namely fact investigation and negotiation, neither of which I know anything
about."
Closer consideration shows that Professor Walker is making a point that is
both less dramatic and less plausible. He thinks that by putting at least some
emphasis on normative arguments and empirical evidence, modem criminal law
casebooks have slighted doctrine, which he equates with cases. As a result,
students are not prepared to practice criminal law when they finish the first-year
course.
I think Professor Walker is off the mark, less about casebooks than about real-
world criminal justice. Unlike private law subjects such as contracts and property
law, American criminal law is not a field of appellate cases. Quite the contrary;
our criminal justice system is in reality a field of administrative law, organized by
statutes that vest very broad discretionary power in public officials, especially
prosecutors.
Only a tiny fraction of criminal prosecutions result in trials, and only some
fraction of those include disputed points of criminal law. If there is a conviction
and an appeal, those points of law will turn less on distinguishing precedents than
on interpreting statutory language. Precedents construing the same or like
language have a place in the rhetoric of penal statutes, but so too do text, structure,
purpose, and background principles like legality and responsibility.
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Often enough, conventional argumentation can justify interpreting the
statutory text in favor of either the government or the accused, and the judges then,
either self-consciously or otherwise, will have reasons other than doctrine for their
decisions. Far more important than discretion on appeal is discretion before trial.
The simplest course of criminal conduct (say, a teenage boy throws a brick
through a store window and steals the merchandise), under modern codes, gives
rise to a wide range of possible charges and penalties. The offender ordinarily
would be prosecuted in juvenile court with a distinctly limited range of
punishments; but there is discretion in the system to try him as an adult. And in
the adult system the range of outcomes can be very wide indeed. The defendant
might be charged with vandalism, theft, and quite possibly burglary. Perhaps more
significantly, he might be charged with multiple counts of theft for removing
different articles. He may have a record of similar offenses and be eligible for
enhanced punishment under a recidivism statute. If he were armed at the time of
the offense he might be subject to a different enhancement. He might have
committed the offense while on conditional release, either awaiting disposition of a
charge or on probation imposed following a prior conviction. The revocation of
his conditional liberty may, or may not, be enough to satisfy the authorities.
The public prosecutor (in an urban felony case, usually an assistant state's
attorney with some experience) decides how to characterize the offender's conduct
in formal terms by deciding what charges to file. Counsel for the defense,
however, will be communicating with the prosecutor, either before or after the
charging decision. This, plus a sentencing hearing, simply is due process for the
great majority of cases.
The lawyers will not try to persuade a judge or a jury, but they will try to
persuade each other. The prosecutor needs a guilty plea just as the defense lawyer
needs a reduction in liability. If some of the counts alleged by the prosecutor are
arguably inconsistent with the statutory language as construed in the cases, defense
counsel should certainly point that out (and likewise, when the prosecutor thinks a
claimed defense is missing one element or another). These discussions are not,
however, by any means limited to the law.
More common than potential legal weaknesses in a charge are potential
factual weaknesses. There may be conflicting accounts by the witnesses, and
prosecutors learn quite soon that the legal-eagle with a keen eye for statutory
loopholes is a less formidable adversary than the squad-car chaser who has learned
to obtain a continuance whenever the state's witnesses are present, and to insist on
speedy trial at the first appearance when they are not. Whatever the nature of the
proof problems facing the government, the defense lawyer will of course point
these out.
Proof problems are a more common defense asset than statutory ambiguities,
but even proof problems are less ubiquitous than purely discretionary choices
about what charges of the many possible to select in a given case. The lawyers in
plea bargaining do something very similar to what they do on appeal in a case
where the legal issue could go either way. Defense counsel makes normative
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arguments as to why the prosecutor should come down on the charges, and the
prosecutor makes similar arguments as to why the defense should settle for the
charges on the table. Those arguments will appeal to fairness or to
consequences-those ancient and abstract ideas of retribution and utility that have
cluttered and confused the casebooks since the days of Wechsler.
It turns out, then, that the most practical course of criminal law instruction is
richly theorized too. How to teach the morality of punishment is a much harder
question than whether. The book I am privileged to edit3 was (very probably, as I
have not read all of them) the most stodgily doctrinal on the market. I assumed the
project after the deaths of Professor Rollin Perkins and Judge Ronald Boyce, and
for better or worse the changes made in the ninth and tenth editions were mine
alone.
I felt it necessary both to modernize the book and to retain its rigorous
doctrinal character. I tried to achieve both objectives by making two choices
directly at odds with Professor Walker's apparent views. The first of these was to
deal with the philosophical issues raised by criminal law directly and initially,
albeit via traditional legal materials. We get at the difference between retribution
and utilitarianism by asking why we use criminal law rather than civil commitment
for the bulk of the business of social control. And we get at the moral limits on
punishment, such as legality, responsibility, equality, and proportionality by
examining the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions enforcing, to some modest
degree, those moral limits even against contrary judgments by elected legislatures.
The second decision was to emphasize actual statutes. Criminal law either
never was, or has long since ceased to be, a body of principles given only
superficially different expressions in different jurisdictions. The more realistic
classroom question is not "How is the Smith case different from the Jones case?"
but "How does the Smith case come out under the statute that governed in Jones?"
The tenth edition carried forward this focus on the actual system by including a
chapter on sentencing, a subject of the greatest importance to both the public and
to defendants, and one that has witnessed more change than any other feature of
the system over the last three decades.
All criminal law casebooks pay some attention to both doctrine and values.
The differences are of degree rather than of kind. Given that practicing lawyers in
all fields need to know enough criminal law to stay clear of it, and that lawyers,
typically without criminal law experience, play such a prominent role in making
criminal justice policy, I am not convinced that preparing students for the actual
practice even ought to be our primary goal.
If that is to be our goal we will surely fail. Probably the single most important
institutional fact a criminal lawyer can know is the size of the trial penalty-the
going rate for pleading guilty. This is a far more elusive question than you might
suppose, and it is also one that varies greatly from practice to practice. Like many
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ed. 2007).
2592009]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
highly important institutional facts, however, it is both all we can do, and quite
enough, if we impress on our students the existence of a trial penalty that will be
their business to learn in practice.
Of the first year courses I suppose the one on civil procedure remains the least
theoretical, but I would not say even the "A+" students at the end of even a six-
hour course in civil practice are ready to become litigators. Indeed, the tricks and
traps of every courthouse are a little different. The best criminal defense lawyer in
New York City is not ready to represent a client facing charges in the Cook
County, Illinois Circuit Court. If we enable our students to learn those tricks and
traps no slower than anyone else, we will have done what we can to prepare them
for practice.
Practice, however, can obscure moral and political issues that deserve at least
some sustained consideration during any lawyer's career. Stuffing the prisons with
underclass young men who were tempted into the drug trade by a set of socially-
constructed incentives is, of course, important work that can and should be done
better rather than worse. We ought indeed to teach our students to do this work as
well as it can be done. I do not believe, however, that our intellectual obligations
end there.
I enjoyed, and learned much from, Professor Walker's essay. He has earned
the gratitude of all criminal law casebook editors, for two reasons. First, he has
connected us with our own tradition, one we can easily lose touch with in the
course of preparing successive editions. Second-and this is, perhaps, the most
radical aspect of his essay-he has taken our project seriously, as a bona fide
intellectual enterprise, rather than as a way for senior professors, bereft of any
novel ideas that might make for good law review articles, to say something rather
than nothing in our annual reports to the Dean (and, perhaps, to help pay for a new
car or a recent divorce). His essay is forcefully correct in pointing out that
casebook construction implicates controversial intellectual and pedagogical issues,
whether those issues get resolved after, or without, reflection. I hope this brief
response shows that for at least some (and I expect for most) of us, that reflection
was long and serious.
260 [Vol 7: 257
